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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interaction between migrantsincome and remittances and between remittances
and the labor supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with imperfect information
about the residentsreal economic situation. Residents subject to a good economic situation may behave
as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to manipulate remitters expectations. The
latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the remitted amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium,
residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook, are penalized as compared to the perfect
information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically cutting working
hours, thus further enhancing their precarity right when their economic situation is the worst.
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1 Introduction
Often the decision to migrate from a developing to a developed country is guided by economic
considerations; in general, migrants are able to get better economic opportunities in the host
country than at home. The left home relatives may also benet from the migrants successful
integration. Indeed, once they found a job abroad, migrants tend to send a signicant part
of their income to their families back home. Over the past fteen years, international migrant
remittances have become an increasingly prominent channel of nancing the developing world,
exceeding o¢ cial aid and getting close to the FDI ow (Ratha, 2005). According to a recent study
by the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Inter-American Development
Bank, in 2006 the ow of remittances towards the developing countries reached 301 billion US
dollars.1
Such a substantial amount of external funding must have an impact on the macroeconomic
equilibrium of developing countries. Several authors studied the impact of remittances on inequal-
ities and poverty in receiving countries (Adams, 2006; Adams and Page, 2005; Lopez-Cordoba,
2006; Adams, 2004). They show that remittances contributed to ghting poverty (measured by
the account index) and especially to reducing the depth of poverty (measured by the poverty
gap index) and the severity of poverty(measured by the squared poverty gap).
While this positive e¤ect on poverty reduction should not be underemphasized, remittances
may also bring about some unpleasant consequences. In particular, by increasing the recipients
wealth, remittances can undermine their incentives to work, which, in turn, would slow down
economic growth. Several studies have investigated the e¤ect of remittances on labor supply in an
empirical set-up without reaching a clear-cut conclusion. For instance, Rodriguez and Tiongson
(2001) show that Filipino households with temporary overseas migrants tend to reduce their labor
participation and hours worked. Airola (2005) observes a negative elasticity between remittances
and labor supply in Mexico. Analyses by Cox-Edwards et al. (2007) and Amuedo-Dorantes and
Pozo (2006), also based on Mexican data, observe a negative relationship between remittances and
1 The study provides estimate for both o¢ cial and uno¢ cial ows of remittances. See
http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/index.htm. O¢ cial ows only were estimated to 207 billion US
dollars by the World Bank (2007).
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labor supply only in narrow segments of the population. Drinkwater et al. (2006) build a standard
labor market matching model where remittances on the one hand decrease the opportunity cost of
unemployment, and on the other hand, support job creation through capital accumulation; their
empirical analysis suggests that the latter e¤ect takes over the former.
Some authors have emphasized that the asymmetric information between the remitter and
the recipient may provide another transmission channel for the negative e¤ect of remittances on
residentse¤ort. For instance, Chami et al. (2005) analyze the impact of remittances when the
resident, who gets these resources, is able to hide his e¤ort to the remitter. In their model, the
migrant is altruistic: his utility depends on the utility of his left home family. They show that
remittances bring about two contradictory e¤ects: on the one hand, an increase in remittances
will reduce recipientswork e¤ort because they become less concerned about the risk of getting a
small income from work; on the other hand, rms react to additional opportunism by increasing
the dispersion of wages in order to stimulate work e¤ort. Since the feed-back e¤ect cannot o¤set
the direct one, remittances have a negative net impact on output.2 Azam and Gubert (2005)
analyze the migration of a family member as part of a diversication strategy that seeks to protect
households from income uncertainty specic to agricultural production. Residents are assumed to
get remittances only if their income falls below a given threshold. The authors highlight a moral
hazard problem: households that can receive remittances tend to decrease their work e¤ort, thus
the probability that the output falls below the critical threshold increases.
This paper analyses the relationships between migrantsincome, amount of remittances and
recipients labor supply in the presence of moral hazard. The analysis focuses on the case of
international migrants, but would apply as well to inland migrations, for instance from rural areas
to industrial cities, with the remark that the informational gap should be stronger in the case of
international migrations.
The model is cast as a two-period game between a migrant who makes a transfer and a
resident who benets from the transfer, given asymmetric information about the real situation
2 This formalization is much in line with those used in models of altruistic transfers within families (Barro, 1974;
Becker, 1974; Laferrère and Wol¤, 2006; and especially Gatti, 2005).
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of the recipient. Both the migrant and the resident maximize their intertemporal utility. The
model builds on the classical signaling methodology developed by Spence (1973, 2002).3 As in
the paper by Chami et al. (2005), migrants are altruistic: their utility depends to some extent
on the residents utility. By contrast, in our model income from work is endogenous: residents
and migrants are subject to an elementary leisure/consumption trade-o¤ that determines their
hour supply.4 The optimal working time depends on their wages and other autonomous gains,
including remittances. The migrants wage is common knowledge: he is supposed to be paid
the same wage as other (migrant) workers in the same sector, which is public information in
developed countries. On the other hand, the residents wage is private information. The migrant
observes the residents working hours during the rst period; he can use this information to
upgrade his expectations about the recipients wage. This sequence of decisions opens the door
for manipulating information: the resident subject to a good economic situation can behave as
if he were in a bad situation only in order to make the donor believe that he is doing badly,
and get more remittances. In an equilibrium with manipulation, when the resident works only a
small amount of hours, the migrant cannot tell without ambiguity whether he made this choice
because he gets a small wage or because he is trying to manipulate him. Given this uncertainty,
the migrant will choose a smaller amount of remittances as compared to the perfect information
set-up. As an upshot of all these, imperfect information imposes a real cost on recipients who
really are victims of a poor economic outlook. To avoid this outcome, they can choose to signal
their type by strongly reducing their working hours during the rst period. Consequently, their
income precarity edges up right when their economic situation is the worst.
One interesting feature of this model is its ability to describe the complex relationship between
the level of remittances and the altruistic migrants wage in case of asymmetric information: on
the one hand, a raise in the migrants wage implies an increase in the amount of remittances
along a traditional wealth e¤ect, and, on the other hand, the more acute risk of opportunistic
3 The logic of strategic signaling draws on Vickers (1986). See also Besancenot and Vranceanu (2005) for a
related game.
4 Migrants can remit to their families and communities still in their origin country for several other reasons.
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) list a series of motivations explaining the existence of remittances: altruism, exchange
(purchase of various types of services, repayments of loans. . . ), strategic motive (positive selection among migrants),
insurance (risks diversication) and investment.
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behavior calls for a reduction in the amount of remittances, what we refer to as the moral hazard
e¤ect. So far this link between remittances and the migrants wage (not the residents) has not
been emphasized by existing theoretical analyses. Empirical evidence is rather scarce; it draws
on the analysis of migrations from rural to urban areas of the same country. For instance, using
data from a survey of African households in Nairobi, Kenya conducted in 1971, Johnson and
Whitelaw (1974) show that the elasticity of remittances with respect to income is positive and
ranges from 0.6 to 0.9, but that the fraction of the wage bill remitted decreases with the urban
wage level. Mohammad et al. (1973) nd the same result using data from a survey in nine
urban centres in Punjab and Sind, Pakistan, conducted in 1971-72. However, Rempel and Lobdell
(1978), using data from a survey conducted in 1968 in eight large urban centres in Kenya, nd that
the proportion of income remitted varies directly with the amount of income earned. Lucas and
Stark (1985) and Hoddinott (1994) nd that remittances are an increasing function of migrants
earnings, using data respectively from Botswana (1978-79) and Kenya (1988). More recent papers
studied the link between remittances and the education level of migrants, which can be seen as a
proxy of their income. Rodriguez and Horton (1994) show that in the Philippines, the education
level of migrants does not have a signicant impact on the level of remittances they send. In an
econometric study on a large panel of developing countries, Faini (2006) show that a higher skilled
content of migration is found to be associated with a lower ow of remittances. Such contrasting
facts are consistent with our results: depending on their relative strengths, the wealth e¤ect can
take over the moral hazard e¤ect or vice-versa.
In this paper, the interaction between the migrant and the resident is assumed to last only two
periods. This is the most stylized framework where we can analyze Bayesian learning and strategic
signaling. Such a framework is best suited for analyzing temporary separations, characterized by
relatively short migration spells such as those who characterize nowadays East - West European
migration. When permanent migration is considered, a repeated game would provide a better
analytical framework. Since the transfer game is nite, the results of the repeated game would
not be fundamentally di¤erent from the two-period game; it would however allow to put forward
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the critical moment when the manipulating resident should reveal his type.5
In order to focus on the economic interpretation of the model, in this paper we will only consider
equilibria featuring interior solutions to the various optimization problems. Hence, in order to
rule out all corner solutions, we will impose from the outset several acceptable restrictions on
parameters values. For instance, we want to make sure that parameters are such that the optimal
transfer is strictly positive. For a broader range of parameters, the optimal transfer to "rich
residents" might well be zero, while it would be positive for "poor" residents. The existence of
the zero lower bound on the optimal transfer would reduce the scope for manipulation, without
fully eliminating it.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic assumptions and the
rule of the game. Section 3 analyses the equilibrium when an explicit signaling strategy cannot
be implemented. Section 4 studies the equilibrium when the resident subject to a poor economic
situation is able to signal his type by drastically cutting his working hours. The nal section
presents the conclusion.
2 Main assumptions
The problem is cast as a, imperfect information game between the migrant (or remitter) and the
resident (or recipient). The two agents live over two periods:6 the rst period starts at time t = 1
and ends at time t = 2; the second starts at time t = 2 and ends at time t = 3. Thereafter, the two
periods will be denoted by index t; which represents the beginning of each period (t 2 f1; 2g). To
keep formalization as simple as possible, we assume that during each time period, the two agents
consume all of their available resources (i.e. they do not save). Both the migrant and the resident
have a job: their income from work depends on their wages and working hours. In addition, the
migrant is altruistic: at the beginning of the second period, he commits to remitting part of his
income to the resident, depending on his own income and on his perceived economic situation of
the resident. We also assume that during the rst period, the resident receives an exogenously
5 The outcome would be di¤erent in an innite horizon game with punishment for "manipulation". In this
alternative set-up the incentive to cooperate is very strong.
6 The migrant and the resident can for example be a couple, with one emigrating and the other left at home.
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given public aid A; in developing countries, such transfers are in general low, but cannot be zero, if
only foreign o¢ cial aid is taken into account. Many governments also give transfers with a poverty
alleviation purpose, often nanced by revenues from exports of natural resources. We assume that
A is such that the residents optimal hour supply during the rst period is strictly positive.
Let s denote the migrants wage and wi denote the residents wage. Total working time will
be normalized to unity, hence s and wi should be interpreted as the one-period wage income to be
obtained by a worker who would work the maximum working time. While the migrants wage is
public information, the residents wage is private information. Residentsincome in a developing
country depends on many factors, such as terms of trade, technology changes, weather, armed
conicts, diseases, and so on. Some of these factors can be observed by migrants living thousands
miles away, some cannot. In this paper, the emphasis is placed on the latter set of factors.
In order to introduce the assumption of imperfect information in the simplest way, we assume
that there are only two possible states of nature: the residents economic situation can be either
good or bad, where he gets accordingly either a (H)igh wage, wi = wH ; or a (L)ow wage, wi = wL;
with wL < wH . Let Pr[wH ] denote the objective probability that the good state of the world
occurs, and Pr[wL] = 1  Pr[wH ] the probability that the bad state of the world occurs. In order
to keep the problem simple, we assume thereafter that Pr[wH ] = Pr[wL] = 0:5.
Figure 1 presents the sequence of decisions of the players along a time line.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Nature chooses the resident’s wage, wH or wL.
The resident receives a public aid A > 0
and chooses his working hours, h1.
The migrant chooses his working hours, τ1. The migrant chooses T and his working hours, τ2.
The resident receives T
and chooses his working hours, h2.
Shirkers are subject to
an end-of-game penalty, θ.
Figure 1: Time line.
At the beginning of the game (t = 1), Nature chooses whether the economic situation of the
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resident is good (he is then paid the high wage wH) or bad (he is then paid the low wage wL). The
migrant does not know the recipients real economic situation, but knows the objective probability
of occurrence of the good (or the bad) economic situation.7 The resident receives a public aid A
and chooses his rst-period working hours h1. The migrant also chooses his rst-period working
hours 1.
At the beginning of the second period (t = 2), the migrant, knowing h1, upgrades his beliefs
over the residents wage, decides on the level of remittances T he will send to the resident to
replace the public subsidy,8 and chooses his second-period working hours 2. The resident then
receives the remittances and reveals his real economic situation by choosing his working hours,
h2. We assume that the parameters of the model are such that the remitted amount is strictly
positive.
Since at the end of the game the resident has revealed his true type, in the context of a strong
interpersonal relationship typical of family ties, it may be reasonable to assume that shirkers
must bear an additional psychological cost, related to the liars stigma, to (foregone) sympathy or
merely to remorse. Converted into money units, such a psychological cost can be represented as
an end-of-game penalty.9 Hence, at the end of the game (t = 3), shirkers are subject to a penalty
 (  0). Of course, for a very large penalty, the problem would become trivial because in this
case manipulation is a dominated strategy. The problem under scrutiny is interesting only if  is
small or even zero.
Let us now introduce the players payo¤s. At each period t 2 f1; 2g, the residents and the
migrants single period preferences over consumption and leisure are respectively summarized by
7 Of course, in real life, migrants have some information about the residents economic situation, and would
adjust their priors accordingly from the outset of the game. Yet this would not change the basic structure of the
game, if they still can learn something about the residents situation from observing his hours supply during the
rst period.
8 In an alternative formulation, remittances could be added to the public subsidy. The structure of the problem
would not change, but the formulas would be unnecessarily complicated.
9 Such a cost has the same e¤ect on the scope for manipulation as a form of limited altruism on behalf of the
resident with respect to the migrant.
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the following utility functions: 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Ut = U(ct; ht) = ct(1  ht);
and
Vt = V (xt;  t) = xt(1   t);
(1)
where ct and xt denote respectively the residents and the migrants consumption; the maximum
duration of work is standardized to the unit and ht and  t denote respectively the residents and
the migrants working hours.10
The migrants single period utility depends to some extent on the residents utility since he
is altruistic (he does not take into account the psychological cost incurred by a manipulating
resident). Thus, we can dene the migrants single period utility Wt by:
Wt =W (xt;  t; ct; ht) = [V (xt;  t)]
(1 )
[U(ct; ht)]
 (2)
where  denotes the degree of altruism, with  2 [0; 1]: When  = 0, the migrant is selsh: the
residents welfare does not matter to him. For  > 0, the migrant can be said to be altruistic.
The residents and the migrants intertemporal utility can respectively be written simply using
an additive form:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Z = U(c1; h1) + U(c2; h2)  1[shirk];
and
 =W1 +W2 = [V (x1; 1)]
(1 )
[U(c1; h1)]

+ [V (x2; 2)]
(1 )
[U(c2; h2)]

:
(3)
Here, the factor 1[shirk] takes the value one in the case of a manipulating resident (who earns wH
and supplies less than his optimal working hours in case of perfect information), and zero in all
other cases.
Finally, at each period t 2 f1; 2g, the residents and the migrants budget constraints are
respectively: 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ct = w
iht +Rt; with i 2 fL;Hg;
and
xt = s t +Bt;
(4)
10 The Cobb-Douglas function conveys in a simple way the neoclassical assumptions about the convexity of
leisure/consumption preferences.
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where Rt and Bt denote respectively the residents and the migrants non-earned income at period
t. The residents non-earned income during the rst period is the exogenous aid, R1 = A, and
during the second period, it is the amount remitted by the migrant, R2 = T . During the rst
period, the migrant receives no exogenous income (B1 = 0), and during the second period, he
transfers resources to the resident (B2 =  T ).
We wan now dene the playersstrategies knowing that the resident seeks to maximize Z; the
migrant seeks to maximize .
The residents strategy (Sr) can be represented by his choice of working hours at each period,
given his wage (which is private information): Sr(i) = (h1; h2)jwi;with i 2 fH;Lg	.
The migrant decides how much he is going to remit (T ) and how long he is going to work
during the two periods (1 and 2), given his income and his expectations about the residents
wage. At the beginning of the game, the migrants beliefs are given. The migrants hours supply
during the rst period (1) is independent from the residents behavior. At the beginning of the
second period, the migrant chooses his remittances (T ) and working hours for the second period
(2) after having observed the residents working hours (during the rst period). Any forecasting
error implies an (ex-post) utility loss for the migrant. Thus, his strategy (Sm) is made up of his
rational guess about the residents wage; at t = 1, his expectations build on his prior beliefs, and
at t = 2; his expectations take into account the residents working hours during the rst period,
h1: In a compact form, we can write: Sm = (E[wijI1]; E[wijI2]) where E[ ] is the expectation
operator and It is the information set at time t; with t 2 f1; 2g: In our simple problem, E[wijI1]
is predetermined.
A Bayesian equilibrium of the game is a situation in which the residents strategy Sr maximizes
his utility given the migrants beliefs, and the migrants beliefs Sm are correct given the optimal
strategy of the resident.
The decision tree presented in Figure 2 summarizes the former elements. At the outset of the
game, Nature picks the state of the world. We will study two classes of equilibria, depending
on whether poor residents resort to strategic signaling by undercutting their rst-period working
hours to h1, below the lowest working time that would prevail with perfect information (hL1 ). If
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all poor residents decide to signal themselves ( = 0), the imperfect information branches of the
game disappear and the game only has the upper and lower branches. If poor residents cannot
resort to strategic signaling, the upper branch vanishes ( = 1) and the game features the three
lower branches. The dotted line that connects the migrants dots is then representative of the
imperfect information set-up: if the resident supplies hL1 hours, the migrant cannot determine his
type exactly.
wL, Pr[wL]
wH , Pr[wH]
Nature Resident ResidentMigrant
h1=h1L, µ
h1=h1L, q
h1=h1H, (1-q)
T(E2[wi])
T(E2[wi])
T(wH)
Payoffs
ResidentMigrant
Z(h1L, h2)
Z(h1L, h2)
Z(h1H, h2)
S(E1[wi],E2[wi])
S(E1[wi],E2[wi])
S(E1[wi],wH)
T(wL) h2(T,wL) Z(h1, h2)
S(E1[wi],wL)
_
h1=h1, (1-µ)
h2(T,wL)
h2(T,wH)
h2(T,wH)
_
Figure 2: Decision Tree.
In the next section we analyze the equilibrium of the game when the resident subject to a bad
economic situation cannot signal his type, i.e. cannot resort to strategic signaling. The case where
the migrant can resort to strategic signaling will be analyzed in Section 4. It will then be shown
that in some cases, even if the resident can signal his type by drastically reducing his working
hours, he will not choose to do so because this strategy is dominated. In this case, the equilibrium
10
developed in the previous section will prevail.
3 Equilibrium without strategic signaling ( = 1)
3.1 The residents choice of working hours during the last period
This sequential game is solved by backward induction. At the beginning of the second period
(t = 2), the resident has already received the remittances T: Thus, he can decide his optimal
working hours hi2, given his wage w
i, without any strategic consideration.
To determine his optimal working hours during the second period, the resident maximizes his
second-period utility given his budget constraint c2 = wih2 + T :
max
h2

U(c2(h2); h2) =
 
wih2 + T

(1  h2)
	
: (5)
The rst order condition is: dU(; )=dh2 = 0: Thus, his optimal working hours are:
hi2 = 0:5
 
1  T=wi ; with i 2 fH;Lg: (6)
The residents second-period labor supply increases with his wage and decreases with the
amount remitted.
Finally, replacing the expression of his labor supply in the utility function, we can write
the residents indirect second-period utility as a function of his wage and remittances: U2 =
u2(T;w
i) = maxfU(c2(h2); h2)g, with the explicit form:
u2(T;w
i) =
0:25
wi
 
T + wi
2
with i 2 fH;Lg: (7)
3.2 The migrants choice of remitted amount and working hours during
the last period
At the beginning of the second period (t = 2), the rst-period migrants utility (W1) has already
been realized. Therefore his decision problem of maximizing  = W1 + W2 is truncated: his
choices will have an impact only on his second-period utility. Hence, he is concerned only about
maximizing W2: Given that he does not know the residents wage, he decides on the amount of
remittances according to his wage estimate, which depends on the information available at the
beginning of the second period (I2). The expected wage is denoted by E[wijI2].
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The migrant must take into account the fact that once the resident gets his remittances, he
is going to decide his second-period working hours such as to maximize his utility. Hence the
migrants optimal choice takes the form of a standard Stackelberg decision problem (where the
migrant is the "leader" and the resident is the "follower"). Let U^2 denote the migrants estimate
of the residents utility maximum, given his expectations about the residents wage (Eq. 7). The
migrants decision problem can be stated as:
max
T;2

W2 = [V (x2; 2)]
(1 )

U^2

with (1) : x2 = s2   T
and (2) : U^2 = u2(T;E

wijI2

) = 0:25E[wijI2]
 
T + E

wijI2
2
(8)
where the constraint (1) is the second-period budget constraint and (2) is the indirect utility of
the resident as estimated by the migrant.
To solve the problem, we introduce the constraints into the objective and write the rst order
conditions, dW2=d2 = 0 and dW2=dT = 0: After some elementary calculations, we obtain the
optimal amount remitted:
T (s;E

wijI2

) = s  (1  )E wijI2 : (9)
It turns out that remittances decrease with the residents wage (as anticipated by the migrant)
and increase with the migrants wage and degree of altruism.
As previously mentioned, in this paper we will focus only on interior solutions to various
optimization problems. Thus, we assume that remittances are strictly positive. This requires
some additional constraints on the parameters values. Since T  decreases with E

wijI2

, the
most general condition for interior solutions is:
T (s; wH) = s  (1  )wH > 0, s > s^  1  

wH or  > ^  w
H
s+ wH
: (10)
Within our framework, for a given level of altruism, the existence of remittances implies a minimum
wage for the migrant (s > s^). Or, for a given migrants wage, the existence of remittances implies
a minimum degree of altruism ( > ^).
12
We can also determine the migrants labor supply during the second period:
2 = 0:5
"
(1 + )  (1  ) E

wijI2

s
#
; (11)
which increases with the migrants wage s, and decreases with the expected value of the residents
wage E

wijI2

.
3.3 The migrants expectations over the residents wage
Notice that when there is perfect information about his wage, the resident cannot aim at ma-
nipulating expectations, and must choose his rst-period working hours with the only objective
of maximizing his rst-period utility (U1 = U(c1; h1)), given his rst-period budget constraint
c1 = A+ w
ih1.
In the perfect information case, the resolution of the residents optimization program implies
that a resident who earns wH (respectively wL) supplies in the rst period hH1 hours (respectively
hL1 ); with h
H
1  0:5
 
1 A=wH and hL1  0:5  1 A=wL, and hH1 > hL1 .
As mentioned earlier, we assume that A is such that the residents optimal hour supply during
the rst period is strictly positive. Thus, we impose a rst restriction on parameters A and wL,
that is A=wL < 1: This is a reasonable assumption, the public aid is probably not very important
in developing countries ; here we assume that it is lower than the total income of a poor worker
over the period (recall that maximum working time has been normalized to one).
We now turn back to our framework with imperfect information. At the beginning of the
game, information available to the migrant about the residents economic situation is summarized
by his prior beliefs: Pr[wH ] = Pr[wL] = 0:5. In this rst part of the analysis, we assume that the
poor resident cannot undercut his rst-period working hours below hL1 in order to signal his type.
Remember that the remitted amount decreases with the residents expected wage. Thus, when
the residents economic situation is truly bad, he has no incentive to behave as if his situation
were good (by choosing hi1 = h
H
1 ); because, not only would he incur a rst-period utility loss, but
he would also receive a smaller amount of remittances. On the other hand, if he gets the high
wage, in case of asymmetric information, the resident may decide to work less as if his wage were
low, in order to make the migrant believe that he is in a bad economic situation. In that case, the
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migrant would remit a higher amount and the residents second-period utility might be higher.
Let us introduce now an important endogenous variable, the probability denoted by q, that a
resident earning wH decides to implement the manipulating strategy (supplies hL1 ). If q = 1 or
q = 0; the rich resident plays pure strategies; if q 2]0; 1[; the rich resident uses this probability for
randomizing between the manipulating and the fair strategies. In equilibrium, the frequency of
rich residents who have implemented the manipulating strategy will be equal to q as well.
Thus, under imperfect information and without strategic signaling, residents earning wL will
supply hL1 hours of work in the rst period; among residents earning w
H , a proportion (1  q) will
reveal their type by working hH1 , and the remaining q will choose to mimic the w
L type and work
hL1 .
The migrants equilibrium beliefs can then be written as the contingent probability that a
resident earning wi (with i 2 fH;Lg) supplies hL1 :
 =
8>><>>:
Pr[hL1 jwL] = 1
Pr[hL1 jwH ] = q; with q 2 [0; 1]
(12)
where Pr[hH1 jwL] = 1  Pr[hL1 jwL] and Pr[hH1 jwH ] = 1  Pr[hL1 jwH ]:
The migrant is able to revise his ex ante probabilities Pr[wH ] and Pr[wL] after observing the
residents working hours at the rst period. Given that the poor resident will never play hH1 ; if
the migrant observes this strategy he can infer that the resident is rich. If the strategy played by
the resident is hL1 , the migrant must make a rational guess on whether the resident is rich or poor.
The expected wage will be an weighted average between wL and wH ; with weights Pr[wLjhL1 ] and
Pr[wH jhL1 ]: We can use Bayes rule to determine these probabilities, given q and Pr[wH ]. It turns
out that:
Proposition 1 In the imperfect information case, the migrants expectations over the residents
wage are:
a) if the resident works hH1 ; then:
E[wijhH1 ] = wH (13)
b) if the resident works hL1 then:
E[wijhL1 ] =
q
1 + q
wH +
1
1 + q
wL (14)
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Proof. The formal proof can be found in Appendix A.1.
It can be easily checked that E[wijhL1 ] is an increasing function in the manipulating probability
q, and varies between wL and 0:5(wL + wH) < wH . Thus, the optimal amount of remittances
(Eq. 9) is bigger if the resident chooses h1 = hL1 than if he chooses h1 = h
H
1 .
3.4 The residents choice of working hours during the rst period
Given former developments, it turns out that when the resident is in a poor economic situation
(wi = wL), he will always choose to work the small amount of time (h1 = hL1 ): he does not
want the migrant to believe that he is well paid because he would then get less remittances. On
the other hand, if the resident is in a good economic situation (wi = wH), he will manipulate
migrants anticipations by choosing to work hL1 with probability q, and will be honest by choosing
to work hH1 with probability 1   q. Extreme cases q = 0 or q = 1 correspond to pure strategies.
In the following, we focus on the mixed strategy case (q 2]0; 1[), which encompasses the two pure
strategies as special situations.
The Nash mixed strategy q 2]0; 1[ is implemented if a "rich" resident (wi = wH) is indi¤erent
between playing hH1 or h
L
1 :
Z(hH1 ; w
H) = Z(hL1 ; w
H) (15)
() u1(hH1 ; wH) + u2(T (wH); wH) = u1(hL1 ; wH) + u2(T (E[wijhL1 ]); wH)  : (16)
After making the necessary substitutions and some calculations presented in Appendix A.2., this
equilibrium condition can be written as s = g(q; ; ; A;wH ; wL); where g() is a function in q and
parameters. Hence, q is implicitly dened as a function of the various parameters, including the
migrants wage s. For our analysis, the most important property is:
Proposition 2 In the hybrid equilibrium, the manipulation probability q is an increasing function
in the migrants wage s.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix A.2.
In this problem, the migrants wage (s) has a direct impact only on the optimal amount of
remittances. In the hybrid equilibrium, some of the rich residents honestly signal themselves by
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working hH1 ; the others aim at manipulating information and work h
L
1 : In a rst step, if s increases,
both the amount of remittances sent to the honest and to the manipulating resident goes up. Yet,
it can be show, that, ceteris paribus, an innitesimal increase in s brings about a larger increase
in the utility of the shirkers than of the honest residents. Hence, when s increases, more residents
are tempted to manipulate information. But if q goes up, the amount of remittances provided
to those who choose the strategy hL1 declines to some extent, and the indi¤erence condition is
recovered.
By setting q = 0 and respectively q = 1, we get the inferior and superior wage thresholds that
separate the three types of equilibria:
q = 0) s0  1
2
( 
wH   wL
(1  )
"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
+ (1  )wL   (1 + )wH
)
(17)
q = 1) s1  1
4
(
4
 
wH   wL
(1  )
"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
+ (1  )wL   (1 + 3)wH
)
;(18)
with s1 > s0:
As previously shown, the assumption that the remitted amount is strictly positive implies that,
for a given level of altruism, the migrants wage rate is above a certain threshold (Eq. 10). Thus,
in order to have the full range of equilibria, including the separating one, we impose the condition
s0 >
1 
 w
H > 0:11
This implies:
s0 > 0()

A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2 > (1  
2) + 2(1  ) w
L
(wH   wL) : (19)
We assume that this condition holds for  = 0, so it will hold for any  > 0.12
When the migrants wage is low (lower than s0), then remittances are low too. Thus, the cost
of working only a small number of hours for a rich resident is higher that the benet linked to
higher remittances. No resident in a good economic situation will nd it benecial to manipulate
information.
11 If s0 <
1 

wH , the separating equilibrium cannot occur. If s1 <
1 

wH , the only possible equilibrium is
the pooling one.
12 This condition, together with the former restriction
 
A=wL

< 1, implies that a non empty set for A=wL
consistent with our framework exists if  > 1 
2k
1 + 2k
, with k  wL
wH wL . Note that the wider the gap between
the two possible wages of the resident, the smaller k is and the easier it is for this condition to be fullled.
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However, when the migrants wage is high (higher than s1), then remittances are high too.
Thus, the cost of working only a small number of hours for a rich resident is lower that the
benet linked to higher remittances. All residents in a good economic situation nd it benecial
to manipulate information.
Finally, when the migrants wage is neither too low nor too high, some residents (q) in a good
economic situation nd it benecial to manipulate information and some (1  q) do not.
Proposition 3 Depending on s, one of the three types of equilibria can occur:
 When s < s0, the equilibrium is separating (q = 0): each type of resident implements a
specic action, either hL1 or h
H
1 , and this action signals his type without ambiguity.
 When s 2 [s0; s1], the equilibrium is hybrid (q 2 ]0; 1[): while the action hH1 signals the
migrants type, the action hL1 does not; the rich resident plays a mixed Nash strategy.
 When s > s1, the equilibrium is of the pooling type (q = 1): all residents, whatever their
wage, choose the same action hL1 , migrants can infer no information from observing resi-
dents rst-period working time h1.
Proof. Residents in a good economic situation all choose to work hH1 if they do not nd it benecial
to pretend they are in a bad economic situation. Formally, Z(hH1 ; w
H) > Z(hL1 ; w
H)() s < s0:
Thus, if s < s0, then the equilibrium is separating. Residents in a good economic situation all
choose to work hL1 if they do nd it benecial to pretend they are in a bad economic situation.
Formally:Z(hH1 ; w
H) < Z(hL1 ; w
H) () s > s1: Thus, if s > s1, then the equilibrium is of the
pooling type. Residents in a good economic situation are indi¤erent between working hL1 and h
H
1
if Z(hH1 ; w
H) = Z(hL1 ; w
H) () s0 < s < s1:Thus, if s 2 [s0; s1], then the equilibrium is hybrid.
Figure 3 displays the regionning of equilibria and the evolution of q with respect to s:
3.5 The equilibrium relationship between remittances and the migrants
wage
According to Eq. (9), optimal remittances depend on the migrants wage and on his evaluation
of the residents wage. But the probabilities that enable him to determine the residents expected
wage depend on his own wage, since the latter has a bearing on the residents behavior. More
precisely, a raise in the migrants wage s generates two opposite e¤ects: on the one hand, there is a
wealth e¤ect such that the migrant, richer, wishes to increase his remittances; on the other hand,
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separating
equilibrium pooling
equilibrium
q: manipulating probability
1
0 s0 s1 s: migrant’s wage
hybrid
equilibrium
Figure 3: Main equilibria according to s (without strategic signaling)
the rise in the amount remitted causes an increase in the probability of manipulation and thus in
the residents wage as expected by the migrant, who is then prompted to reduce his remittances.
In this model, the positive wealth e¤ect overrides the negative moral hazard e¤ect. Indeed, it can
be shown that:
Proposition 4 Remittances are an increasing function of the migrants wage:
Proof. Appendix A.3 shows that
dT 
ds
=    (1  ) dE

wijhL1

dq
dq
ds
> 0:
Finally, note that the residents working hours during the second period are a decreasing
function of remittances (Eq. 9). Thus, the e¤ect of a raise in the migrants wage on the residents
hours supply is negative.
3.6 The migrants choice of working hours during the rst period
In order to conclude the analysis of individual strategies, we can analyze the migrants choice of
working hours during the rst period. His decision problem is:
max1

 = [V (x1; 1)]
(1 )
h
U^1
i
+ [V (x2; 2)]
(1 )
h
U^2
i
with 8t; xt = s t +Bt; and B1 = 0; B2 =  T
with U^1 = u1(A;E[wijI1]) = 0:25E[wijI1]
 
A+ E[wijI1]
2
with U^2 = u2(T;E[wijI2]) = 0:25E[wijI2]
 
T + E[wijI2]
2
and E[wijI1] = 0:5(wH + wL):
(20)
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Given the assumption that the migrant gets no exogenous income (B1 = 0), the migrants working
hours at time t = 1 do not depend on his expectations about the residents wage as determined
at the beginning of the game, E[wijI1].13 It is easy to check that the optimal solution is 1 = 0:5.
3.7 A welfare comparison
This subsection aims at providing a comparison in terms of welfare between the perfect and
imperfect information case. We focus on the case of the poor resident in the hybrid equilibrium.
Indeed, if he incurs a welfare loss, he may try to implement a strategy of signalization (to be
analyzed in the next section).
In the case of perfect information, the resident subject to the good economic situation cannot
manipulate information because the migrant knows his wage. Therefore, like in the separating
equilibrium, each type of resident has a specic rst-period strategy: if wi = wL then h1 = hL1
and if wi = wH then h1 = hH1 . In this case, the poor residents utility would be:
ZP(hL1 ; w
L) = u1(h
L
1 ; w
L) + u2(T
(wL); wL) (21)
where superscript P stands here for perfect information.
In the case of imperfect information, we have shown that some rich residents may implement
the manipulation strategy. In the hybrid equilibrium (and the pooling one as well), the poor
residents utility is:
ZI(hL1 ; w
L) = u1(h
L
1 ; w
L) + u2(T
(E[wijhL1 ]); wL) (22)
where superscript I indicates imperfect information. The utility loss (in absolute value) of the
poor resident due to the imperfection of information can be written:
ZP(hL1 ; w
L)  ZI(hL1 ; wL) = u2(T (wL); wL)  u2(T (E[wijhL1 ]); wL): (23)
Since T I = T (E[wijhL1 ]) < TP = T (wL); it is easy to see that in the hybrid equilibrium, the
poor resident undergoes a utility loss:
u2(T
(wL); wL) > u2(T (E[wijhL1 ]); wL), ZP(hL1 ; wL) > ZI(hL1 ; wL): (24)
13 Since in this problem E[wijI1] is a constant, this simplication does not modify the basic structure of the
game.
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Appendix A.4 presents the exact expression of ZP(hL1 ; w
L)   ZI(hL1 ; wL) with respect to q and
parameters.
Likewise, we can write the utility gain of the rich resident due to the imperfection of infor-
mation. The intertemporal utility of a rich resident is the same in case of perfect information
and in the hybrid equilibrium in case of imperfect information. Indeed, in the hybrid equilibrium,
we know that: ZI(hL1 ; w
H) = ZI(hH1 ; w
H). Yet, ZI(hH1 ; w
H) = ZP(hH1 ; w
H). Note that in the
pooling equilibrium, the intertemporal utility of a rich resident is higher than in the perfect infor-
mation set-up since rich residents get a higher amount of remittances than in the case of perfect
information (ZI(hL1 ; w
H) > ZI(hH1 ; w
H) = ZP(hH1 ; w
H)).
Finally, in the hybrid equilibrium (and in the pooling one as well), imperfect information entails
an ex-post welfare loss for the migrant, because he makes his decisions based on an inaccurate
expected value of the residents wage; he would remit too much to a "rich" resident, and too little
to a "poor" one.
Thus, the total welfare in the hybrid equilibrium is lower than in the case of perfect information
(the poor resident and the migrant undergo a welfare loss, the rich resident is indi¤erent).
4 Equilibrium with strategic signaling ( = 0)
We have shown that when rich residents have an incentive to manipulate (for s > s0), if poor
residents cannot reduce their rst-period working hours h1 below the perfect information lowest
working time (hL1 ) in order to signal their type, they incur a welfare loss as compared to a situation
with perfect information. In this section we relax the constraint on working hours, and allow poor
residents to adjust working hours strategically. Indeed, according to the traditional argument
(Vickers, 1986; Spence, 2002), the poor resident may try to signal his real situation (unfavorable)
by undercutting working hours and accepting a degradation of his utility during the rst period,
provided that the reduction will not be implemented by a possible manipulator. Let us denote by
h1 the working hours that allow signalization, with h1 < hL1 :
In this paper we will study only the case where the poor resident strictly prefers to signal
himself to not signalling; in equilibrium, all poor residents undercut working hours ( = 0). If this
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form of strategic signaling is e¤ective, then the prevailing equilibrium is of the separating type.14
The equilibrium with strategic signaling is dened here as a situation where residents earning
wL all supply h1 hours (with h1 < hL1 ), and residents earning w
H all supply hH1 .
In this context, migrants equilibrium beliefs can be written:
 =
8>><>>:
Pr[h1jwL] = 1
Pr[hH1 jwH ] = 1
: (25)
The strategy of voluntary contraction of working hours is dominant if the two following conditions
are fullled.
Condition 1 or incentive constraint : signalization has to be e¤ective; in other words, it has to
dissuade the manipulator (who is inevitably in a favorable situation, wH) from choosing the same
strategy as the poor resident. A manipulator does not nd it benecial to work h1 and, under
the separating conditions, to be considered without ambiguity as a poor resident, if his gains are
higher when he is honest (he then works hH1 and signals his type):
Z(h1; w
H) < Z(hH1 ; w
H) (26)
u1(h1; w
H) + u2(T
(wL); wH)   < u1(hH1 ; wH) + u2(T (wH); wH): (27)
Condition 2 or participation constraint : signalization has to be protable for the poor resident. If
he undergoes the cost of reduced working hours during the rst period, his intertemporal utility
with signalization must nevertheless be higher than in the absence of signalization (and thus
without cost during the rst period):
Z(h1; w
L) > Z(hL1 ; w
L) (28)
u1(h1; w
L) + u2(T
(wL); wL) > u1(hL1 ; w
L) + u2(T
(E[wijhL1 ]); wL): (29)
Appendix B.1 shows that Condition 1 is satised if:
h1 < h
H
1  
p
z1; (30)
14 Notice that this is not the only equilibrium with strategic signaling. The game also presents an equilibrium
where a poor resident is indi¤erent between signaling or not by undercutting his working hours; in this hybrid
equilibrium, a fraction  2]0; 1[ of poor residents signal themselves.
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with:
z1 
(1  )(wH   wL)[2(s+ wL) + (1 + )  wH   wL]  4wH
4 (wH)
2 > 0: (31)
Threshold z1 depends on s; but not on q; because in the separating equilibrium, q is null. Rational
residents will choose the highest working hours that guarantee signalization:
h1  hH1  
p
z1: (32)
In Appendix B.1, we prove that when s > s0, h1 is always strictly inferior to hL1 . It implies that, in
this game, signalization by reduction of working hours is always a possible strategy for a resident
in an unfavorable economic situation.
As for Condition 2, it is satised if (see Appendix B.1):
h1 > h
L
1  
p
z2; (33)
with:
z2  q
 
wH   wL2
4 (wL)
2
("
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  1  
2
1 + q
)
> 0: (34)
(Condition (19) enables us to make sure that z2 > 0 and dz2=dq > 0).
We can state now that:
Proposition 5 There is a signalization strategy by reduction of rst-period working hours which
is e¤ective and protable if and only if:
p
z1  pz2 < hH1   hL1 ; with hH1   hL1 =
A
wL
 
wH   wL
2wH
> 0: (35)
Proof. We have shown that the smallest hours supply that guarantees signalization is h1 =
hH1  
p
z1 (condition 32) and that it is worth signaling if h1 > hL1  
p
z2 (condition 33). Both
conditions are simultaneously fullled if hH1  
p
z1 > h
L
1  
p
z2 , pz1   pz2 < hH1   hL1 ; with
hH1   hL1 = AwL
 
wH   wL
2wH
> 0:
Of course, whether condition (35) is met or not depends on the parameters of the problem.
Since z1 and z2 have rather complex mathematical expressions, it is impossible to put forward a
simple principle of existence of the equilibrium with strategic signaling. However, some intuition
can be brought for the polar cases where s is close to s0 and s is close to s1 (with s 2 [s0; s1];
specic to the hybrid equilibrium).
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 When s is close to s0, q = 0 and thus z2 = 0. The previous condition becomes: hL1 <
hH1  
p
z1 = h1 which is impossible because it was shown that h1 < hL1 : Thus, signalization
by modulating working hours is not protable when foreign wages are close to s0. This result
seems quite logical: when s is close to s0, almost nobody is cheating hence signalization is
unnecessary.
 When s is close to s1; Appendix B.2 shows that condition (35) can be fullled for a broad
range of parameters if wH is large enough. Indeed, if s is close to s1, q is close to one and
poor residents get too low an amount of remittances. They thus have a strong incentive to
signal themselves. On the other hand, if wH is large, rich residents have little incentive to
implement the same strategy. Should they do so, they lose too much: the opportunity cost
(hL1   h1)wH is too big.
If strategic signaling is a dominated strategy for the poor residents, the equilibrium of the
game is the one analyzed in the previous section.
5 Conclusion
In general, empirical studies highlight the positive e¤ect of migrants remittances on poverty
reduction in developing countries. Some economists noticed that remittances could nevertheless
bring about adverse e¤ects on recipientswork e¤ort. In this paper we aim at analyzing on the
one hand the relationship between remitterswage and the amount of remittances, and on the
other hand, the relationship between the amount of remittances and residentslabor supply.
The model is cast as a two-period game between an altruistic migrant and a resident who
receives remittances, under the assumption of imperfect information concerning the residents
economic situation. Optimal hour supply of both the remitter and the recipient is the outcome
of a traditional arbitrage between consumption and leisure, given the various transfers. It was
shown that in the Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium, a resident in a good economic situation can try
to manipulate the migrants expectations by adopting the same behavior as a resident subject to
a bad economic situation. The imperfection of information is thus detrimental to poor residents,
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because, not being able to signal their type, they receive a reduced amount of remittances. It is
also prejudicial to the altruistic migrant who remits less (more) than he would like to a poor (rich)
resident. Therefore manipulation leads to a fall in the labor supply of the receiving country that
may harm economic growth in the long run, in particular if time saved by shirkers is not used in
a productive way (for instance, for investment in human capital). In some cases, poor residents
can implement an expensive signaling strategy, which consists in drastically reducing their hour
supply. This strategy is likely to reinforce the income precarity of residents right when they meet
the worst economic outlook.
The model is based on several assumptions, and some of them are simplifying. In particular,
we did not take into account the possibility for the resident to save resources during the rst period
which he could consume during the second period. The problem that integrates the intertemporal
choice of consumption would require an even more complex formalization. Besides, it could be
interesting to study the virtues of alternative contracting mechanisms between the migrant and the
resident. For instance, if the migrant could commit to the amount of remittances at the beginning
of the rst period, this would dissuade the rich resident from cheating. Yet this contract might
be dominated, since it would imply less insurance for the poor resident.
Simplications used in this paper are the price to pay to get a straightforward analysis of the
inuence of imperfect information on the amount remitted on the one hand, and on labor supply
on the other hand. Compared to existing theoretical models, this model submits an explanation of
remittances linked not only to the residents wage but also to the migrants wage. This relationship
between the migrants wage and the amount remitted is complex, because the traditional wealth
e¤ect can be partly o¤set by the reinforcement of the incentive to cheat for recipients.
If it is di¢ cult to draw strong conclusions in terms of economic policy from a model which
remains very stylized, results call for a cautious assessment of the macroeconomic impact of private
intrafamily remittances. In the light of our analysis, any reform able to reduce the asymmetry
of information between migrants and recipients should contribute to improve the situation of the
poorest residents. There is no miracle solution able to achieve this result, but the reduction in
telecommunications or in travelling costs should go in the right direction. It seems logical to
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assume that migrants can better observe the residentssituations when they make frequent trips
back to their origin country. It should be noticed that for illegal immigrants it is almost impossible
to travel back and forth, thus the degree of asymmetry is the largest. Shifting the structure of the
immigration ow, from illegal to o¢ cial, may also be taken into consideration.
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A Appendix
A.1 The residents expected wage
Proof of Proposition 1.
a) If the resident chooses to work hH1 , given that Pr[h
H
1 jwL] = 0; Bayesian calculation of
conditional probabilities are:
Pr[wH jhH1 ] =
Pr[hH1 jwH ] Pr[wH ]
Pr[hH1 jwH ] Pr[wH ] + Pr[hH1 jwL] Pr[wL]
= 1 (A.36)
Pr[wLjhH1 ] = 0: (A.37)
The expected value of the residents wage is simply: E

wijhH1

= wH :
b) If the resident chooses to work hL1 ; Bayesian calculation of probabilities yields:
Pr[wH jhL1 ] =
Pr[hL1 jwH ] Pr[wH ]
Pr[hL1 jwH ] Pr[wH ] + Pr[hL1 jwL] Pr[wL]
=
q
1 + q
(A.38)
Pr[wLjhL1 ] = 1  Pr[wH jhL1 ] =
1
1 + q
: (A.39)
The information set I2 used by the migrant when t = 2 to revise probabilities includes as the
single salient piece of information the residents working hours during the rst period: I2 = fh1g:
The expected value of the residents wage conditional on I2, E

wijI2

, can then be written:
E[wijhL1 ] =
q
1 + q
wH +
1
1 + q
wL (40)
with E[wijhL1 ] 2 [wL; 0:5(wL + wH)].
The expected value of the residents wage increases with the probability of adopting the strategy
of manipulating expectations:
dE[wijhL1 ]
dq
=
wH   wL
(1 + q)
2 > 0; (41)
to reach its highest value for q = 1 (when everybody works hL1 , the migrant cannot revise prior
probabilities, therefore Pr[wH jhL1 ] = Pr[wLjhL1 ] = 0:5).
A.2 The manipulating probability q
Proof of Proposition 2.
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The Nash mixed strategy q 2]0; 1[ is implemented if a "rich" resident (wi = wH) is indi¤erent
between playing hH1 or h
L
1 (equation 15 in the main text):
Z(hH1 ; w
H) = Z(hL1 ; w
H): (42)
In a rst step, we estimate Z(hL1 ; w
H). Knowing that hL1 = 0:5(1   A=wL), we can write the
residents rst-period utility as: U1 = U(c1(hL1 ); h
L
1 ) = u1(h
L
1 ; w
H) with:
u1(h
L
1 ; w
H) = (wHhL1 +A)(1  hL1 )
= 0:25(1 +A=wL)[wH(1 A=wL) + 2A]: (A.43)
Then, we know that E[wijhL1 ] = wH q1+q + wL 11+q : Thus, optimal remittances (Eq. 9) are:
T  = s  (1  )

wH
q
1 + q
+ wL
1
1 + q

; (44)
so, the second-period indirect utility function can be written (Eq. 7):
u2(T
(E[wijhL1 ]); wH) =
0:25
wH

s  (1  )

wH
q
1 + q
+ wL
1
1 + q

+ wH
2
=
0:25
wH(1 + q)2
[s(1 + q)  (1  )wL + (1 + q)wH ]2: (A.45)
In a second step, we calculate Z(hH1 ; w
H). We know that hH1 = 0:5(1   A=wH), thus, U1 =
U1(c1(h
H
1 ); h
H
1 ) = u1(h
H
1 ; w
H); with:
u1(h
H
1 ; w
H) = (wHhH1 +A)(1  hH1 ) =
0:25
wH
(A+ wH)2: (46)
Knowing that E[wijhH1 ] = wH and T  = s  (1  )wH , the second-period utility function (Eq.
7) becomes:
u2(T
(wH); wH) =
0:25
wH
 
T  + wH
2
=
0:252
wH
 
s+ wH
2
: (47)
We can check that when s increase, for a given q the shirkersutility gain exceeds the utility gain
of the honest residents:
d

Z(hL1 ; w
H)  Z(hH1 ; wH)

ds
=
(1  )
2(1 + q)

wH   wL
wH

> 0: (48)
Taking into account the expressions of the one period utilities, the indi¤erence condition (15)
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becomes:
u1(h
H
1 ; w
H) + u2(T
(wH); wH) = u1(hL1 ; w
H) + u2(T
(E[wijhL1 ]); wH)   (A.49)
, (1 + q)2  wH   wL A
wL
2
= (1  )
2664 2s(1 + q)  (1  )wL
+(1 + 2q + )wH
3775  (1 + q)2 4wHwH   wL :(A.50)
This last equation can be written as a relationship between s and q of the form s = g(q; ; ; A;wH ; wL):
s =
1
2(1 + q)
(
(1 + q)2
 
wH   wL
1  
"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
+ (1  )wL   (1 + 2q + )wH
)
> 0:
(51)
Di¤erentiating this expression, we get:
dq
ds
=
2(1 + q)2(1  )
(wH   wL)
n
(1 + q)2
h
(A=wL)2 + 4wH= (wH   wL)2
i
+ (1  )2
o > 0: (52)
as has been stated in Proposition 2.
A.3 Remittances and migrants wage
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let us study the formal relationship between T and s. From the expression of optimal remit-
tances, T  = s  (1  )E wijhL1  ; we can write:
dT 
ds
=    (1  ) dE

wijhL1

dq
dq
ds
: (53)
We replace by the expressions (41) and (52) to get:
dT 
ds
= 
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
  (1  )
2
(1 + q)2h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
+
(1  )2
(1 + q)2
: (54)
The sign of
dT 
ds
is the same as the sign of
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
  (1  )
2
(1 + q)2
: This term is positive.
Indeed,
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
  (1  )
2
(1 + q)2

h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
  (1  )2 8q. Yet, according to
Condition (19),
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
>
 
1  2+ 2 (1  ) k. Thus,"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  (1  )
2
(1 + q)2
  1  2+ 2 (1  ) k   (1  )2 8q"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  (1  )
2
(1 + q)2
 2 (1  ) (1 + k)  0 8q: (A.55)
29
A.4 Utility loss of a poor resident in case of imperfect information
When information is perfect, the poor residents utility is:
ZP(hL1 ; w
L) = u1(h
L
1 ; w
L) + u2(T
(wL); wL): (56)
When information is imperfect, in the hybrid equilibrium the poor residents utility is:
ZI(hL1 ; w
L) = u1(h
L
1 ; w
L) + u2(T
(E[wijhL1 ]); wL): (57)
Knowing that:
u2(T
(wL); wL) =
0:25
wL
(T (wL) + wL)2
=
0:25
wL
(s  (1  )wL + wL)2 = 0:25
2
wL
(s+ wL)2; (A.58)
and that, according to Eq. (9):
u2(T
(E[wijhL1 ]); wL) =
0:25
wL
(T (E[wijhL1 ]) + wL)2
=
0:25
wL
(s  (1  )

wH
q
1 + q
+ wL
1
1 + q

+ wL)2; (A.59)
we can write the residents loss depending on q:
Z
P
(hL1 ; w
L)  ZI(hL1 ; wL) =
0:252
wL
(s+ wL)2   0:25
wL

s  (1  )

wH
q
1 + q
+ wL
1
1 + q

+ wL
2
=
0:25
wL
(1  ) q
1 + q
 
wH   wL; (A.60)
with  = 2s+ 11+q

(2 + q + q)wL   (q   q)wH :
However, in the hybrid equilibrium:
s =
1
2(1 + q)
(
(1 + q)2
 
wH   wL
1  
"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
+ (1  )wL   (1 + 2q + )wH
)
:
(61)
Thus:
 =
1
1 + q
2664
(1+q)2(wH wL)
1 
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
+(1  )wL   (1 + 2q + )wH + (2 + q + q)wL   (q   q)wH
3775
= (wH   wL) (1 + q)
(1  )
("
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  1  
2
1 + q
)
: (A.62)
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The di¤erence between the two utilities is:
ZP(hL1 ; w
L)  ZI(hL1 ; wL) = q
 
wH   wL2
4wL
("
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  1  
2
1 + q
)
: (63)
The sign of ZP(hL1 ; w
L)  ZI(hL1 ; wL) is the sign of the term:

 =
"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  1  
2
1 + q
; (64)
which is an increasing function in q: Its smallest value is obtained for q = 0, with 
q=0 =h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
   1  2 : But, for s0 > 0, which is the case under scrutiny, we have
shown in Condition (19) that:
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
> (1   2) + 2(1   )k >  1  2. Thus,

q=0 > 0) 
 > 0 8q > 0. Thus ZP(hL1 ; wL)  ZI(hL1 ; wL) > 0 8q > 0:
B Appendix
B.1 Signaling conditions
Condition 1: Incentive constraint
We study if signalization by the poor resident through reduction of his rst-period labor supply
is possible.
We calculate: u1(h1; wH) = (wHh1 +A)(1  h1); u1(hH1 ; wH) = 0:25wH (A+ wH)2; u1(h1; wL) =
(wLh1 +A)(1  h1) and u1(hL1 ; wL) = 0:25wL (A+ wL)2:
Knowing that: u2 = 0:25wi (T
 + wi)2; T  = s   (1   )E[wijhL1 ]; and E[wijhL1 ] = wH q1+q +
wL 11+q , we get:
u2(T
(wL); wH) = 0:25
wH
(s  (1  )wL + wH)2
u2(T
(wH); wH) = 0:25
2
wH
(s+ wH)2
u2(T
(wL); wL) = 0:25
wL
(T  + wL)2 = 0:25
wL
(s  (1  )wL + wL)2 = 0:252
wL
(s+ wL)2
u2(T
(E[wi]); wL) = 0:25
wL
n
s  (1  )
h
wH q1+q + w
L 1
1+q
i
+ wL
o2
We can then rewrite Condition 1:
u2(T
(wL); wH)  u2(T (wH); wH)   < u1(hH1 ; wH)  u1(h1; wH)
0:25
wH
(s  (1  )wL + wH)2   0:25
2
wH
(s+ wH)2    < 0:25
wH
(A+ wH)2   (wHh1 +A)(1  h1)
(1  )(wH   wL)[2s  (1  )wL + (1 + )wH ]  4wH < [(wH  A)  2wHh1]2
(1  )(wH   wL)[2(s+ wL) + (1 + )(wH   wL)]  4wH < 4(wH)2(hH1   h1)2; (B.65)
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where hH1   h1 > 0:
Let us denote:
z1 =
(1  )(wH   wL)[2(s+ wL) + (1 + )(wH   wL)]  4wH
4(wH)2
> 0: (66)
Thus, separation is possible if there is a h1 2]0; hL1 [ such that:
(hH1   h1)2 > z1 () h1 < hH1  
p
z1: (67)
The resident chooses the highest working hours possible:
h1 ' hH1  
p
z1: (68)
We check that h1 < hL1 :
hH1  
p
z1 < h
L
1 
hH1   hL1
2
<
(1  )(wH   wL)[2(s+ wL) + (1 + )  wH   wL]  4wH
4 (wH)
2
 
wH   wL2 A
wL
2
< (1  )(wH   wL) 2(s+ wL) + (1 + )  wH   wL  4wH  Y (s):(B.69)
In this inequality, the right term denoted Y (s) is a function increasing in s.
We calculate Y (s0), with s0  12

(wH wL)
(1 )
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
+ (1  )wL   (1 + )wH

:
Y (s0) = (w
H   wL)2

A
wL
2
: (70)
In the hybrid equilibrium, s > s0. Thus:
 
wH   wL2 A
wL
2
= Y (s0) < Y (s); 8s, h1 < hL1 ;8s: (71)
Condition 2: Participation constraint
We study if signalization by the poor resident through reduction of his rst-period labor supply
is protable to him:
Z(h1; w
L) > Z(hL1 ; w
L)
u1(h1; w
L) + u2(T
(wL); wL) > u1(hL1 ; w
L) + u2(T
(E[wijhL1 ]); wL)
4wL(wLh1 +A)(1  h1) + 2(s+ wL)2 > (A+ wL)2 + [s  1  
1 + q
(qwH + wL) + wL]2
 4wLwL(h1)2 + 4wLh1(wL  A) + [4wLA  (A+ wL)2] >

s  1  
1 + q
(qwH + wL) + wL
2
  2(s+ wL)2:(B.72)
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However, (wL  A) = 2hL1wL; thus the former inequality becomes:
 4(wL)
h 
h1
2   2h1hL1 +  hL1 2i > s  1  1 + q (qwH + wL) + wL
2
  2(s+ wL)2
4(wL)2
 
hL1   h1
2
< (s+ wL)2  

s  1  
1 + q
(qwH + wL) + wL
2
4(wL)2
 
hL1   h1
2
<

q
1  
1 + q
(wH   wL)
8>><>>:2s 
1
1 + q
2664 (1  )qwH
 (2 + q + q)wL
3775
9>>=>>; :(B.73)
We know that in the hybrid equilibrium (eq. 61),
s =
1
2(1 + q)
(
(1 + q)2
 
wH   wL
1  
"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
+ (1  )wL   (1 + 2q + )wH
)
:
We can then rewrite Condition 2 :
4(wL)2
 
hL1   h1
2
< q
1  
(1 + q)2
(wH   wL)
8>><>>:
(1+q)2(wH wL)
1 
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
 (1 + )(1 + q)(wH   wL)
9>>=>>;
4(wL)2
 
hL1   h1
2
< q(wH   wL)2
("
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  (1 + ) (1  )
1 + q
)
:(B.74)
Let us denote:
z2 = q
 
wH   wL2
4 (wL)
2
("
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  1  
2
1 + q
)
: (75)
Given that, according to condition (64), z2 > 0; and that hL1   h1 > 0; Condition 2 can be
rewritten:  
hL1   h1
2
< z2 , hL1  
p
z2 < h1: (76)
B.2 Equilibrium with signalization: the case s close to s1
When s! s1, q ! 1. Replacing s by s1 (Eq. 18) in Eq. (31), threshold z1 becomes:
[z1]s=s1 =
(wH   wL)2
4 (wH)
2
"
2

A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2 + 0:5(1  )
2
#
; (77)
and threshold z2 becomes:
[z2]q=1 =
 
wH   wL2
4 (wL)
2
("
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2
#
  0:5(1  2)
)
: (78)
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Inequality (35) can be written:"
2

A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2 + 0:5(1  )
2
#1=2
 w
H
wL
"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2   0:5(1  
2)
#1=2
<
A
wL
:
(79)
Let us denote by C(wH) the left hand side term of this inequality: For wH = 0; this term is
positive. We can prove that above a certain threshold, i.e. for wH high enough (as compared to
wL), C(wH) becomes negative and thus, condition (35) is fullled.
 Indeed, C(wH) < 0 is equivalent to:"
2

A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2 + 0:5(1  )
2
#1=2
<
wH
wL
"
A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2   0:5(1  
2)
#1=2
2

A
wL
2
+ 0:5(1  )2 <

wH
wL
2 2664
 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2
 0:5(1  2)
3775  4wH(wH   wL)2 :(B.80)
As limwH!+1
h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2   0:5(1  
2)
i
=
h 
A
wL
2   0:5(1  2)i and limwH!+1  4wH(wH wL)2 =
0, we can conclude that limwH!+1

wH
wL
2 h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2   0:5(1  
2)
i
  4wH
(wH wL)2

=
+= 1, depending on the sign of
h 
A
wL
2   0:5(1  2)i when wH ! +1.
Yet, according to condition (19):

A
wL
2
+
4wH
(wH   wL)2 > (1  
2) + 2(1  ) w
L
wH   wL
A
wL
2
  0:5(1  2) > 0:5(1  2) + 2(1  ) w
L
wH   wL  
4wH
(wH   wL)2 :(B.81)
As limwH!+1
h
0:5(1  2) + 2(1  ) wL
wH wL   4w
H
(wH wL)2
i
= 0:5(1 2) > 0, we can con-
clude that limwH!+1

wH
wL
2 h 
A
wL
2
+ 4w
H
(wH wL)2   0:5(1  
2)
i
  4wH
(wH wL)2

= +1. Thus,
above a certain threshold, i.e. for wH high (compared to wL), C(wH) is negative. Neces-
sarily, condition (79) is fullled (since A
wL
> 0). Therefore, signalization is possible and
protable for a resident in a di¢ cult economic situation when wH is relatively high.
Notice that in the case where the psychological cost linked to cheating is null ( = 0),
condition (79) becomes:"
2

A
wL
2
+ 0:5(1  )2
#1=2
  w
H
wL
"
A
wL
2
  0:5(1  2)
#1=2
<
A
wL
: (82)
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The left hand side term is obviously decreasing in wH . It is then easy to see that above a
certain threshold, i.e. for wH high (compared to wL), condition (79) is fullled.
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